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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Respondents adopt the statement of Appellant set 
out as the disposition in the lower Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the motion to dismiss the 
appeal of Appellant granted due to the fact that the re-
quiremPnts of Rule 73 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure were not compiled with by the Appellant. 
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In the alternative the Respondents seek to have the 
order admitting the Will to Probate on January 4, 196(; 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents accept the Statement of Facts as being 
true as set forth in their brief with the following addi-
tions: 
Mary E. Ratliff, deceased, had her legal residence 
in Vernal, Utah, for Fifty years and on May 3, 1965, at 
Vernal, fell and broke her hip. She was flown to Dermr 
for medical treatment where she passed away on Jmw 
20, 1965. 
Respondents filed their Petition for Probate of the 
Will on November 19, 1965, in the Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict, Uintah County, State of Utah. The Appellant agreed 
to pay the designated amounts to the legatees of tlw ' 
Will if the Will were probated in Colorado. This was 
agreed to by the parties and the Petition for Probate was • 
set for hearing on December 13, 1965. At that time the 
children of Mrs. Conrad, Appellant, filed the Will Contest 
and the Will was not admitted to probate in Colorado. 
Respondents then noticed their Petition for Probate , 
on January 4, 1966. The 1Court, based upon the evidence 
presented, admitted the certified copy of the Will to 
Probate in Utah, with instruction to obtain the original 
Will. 
Shortly thereafter the Respondents filed a Petition 
to Dislodge the Will in Colorado and the same was set 
for hearing on March 16, 1966. At that hearing the Court 
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hpard evidence on the original Will from l\Ir. Harold 
Sargent, one of the Witnesses to the Will, and from Mr. 
Morris Cook, the Clerk of the Court of Uintah County, 
StatP of Utah. Similar evidence was presented as was 
produced in Utah. The Appellant could not and did not 
:-how any evidence to indicate that Mary E. Ratliff was 
a resident of Colorado or that she intended to change her 
residPnce to Colorado. 
·when this Appeal was filed the Court in Colorado 
stayed the proceedings pending the ruling of this Court 
on the Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 
73\a) IN FILING THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
l\IOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL SHOULD HA VE 
BEEN GRANTED. 
Respondents Motion to Dismiss Appeal should have 
been granted by this Honorable Court due to the fact 
that the filing fee did not accompany the N oticc of Appeal 
when filed ·with the County Clerk of Uintah County on 
April 1, 1966. By the admission of counsel for appellant 
the record discloses that the filing fee was not received 
until Friday, April 8, 1966. It was then and only then 
that the County Clerk could proceed to file the Notice 
of Appeal. 
In Jacobsen v. Jeffries, 86 U. 587, 47 P. 2d 892 (1935) 
this Court held: 
"Leaving a paper with a filing officer, a fee for 
the filing of which is by the statute required to 
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be paid,_in advance, is not a filing. It is the duty of 
the officer to collect and pay into the proper 
~re::isury the fee provided by law before the paper 
is filed. Should such officer inadvertently or othei-
wise file a paper for which a fee is required to 1i~ 
paid, he is forthwith bound to account for such 
fee whether or not he collected the fee at the tini~ 
the paper was left for filing." 
"Under our law the filing of the record consists of 
two acts, one of which is payment of the fee, and 
the other of which is delivering the record to tht· 
clerk. Neither act standing alone is a filing, or a 
half filing, or of any avail as a filing.'' Gee r. 
Smith, 52 Utah, 602, 176 P. 620, 621. 
The Jacobsen case, supra, was cited in State 0. [\el- , 
son, Wash. , 107, P. 2d 1113, ( 1940). This case and 
many cited therein conclude that a filing fee is a payment 
in advance by statute and is a condition precedent to 
the filing of Notice of Appeal. No filing is effective 1rith-
out the payment of a fee when required by statute. 
In other cases it is held that a paper is filed when 
it has been delivered to the proper officer and received 
to be kept in the official records, does not apply where 
the payment of a stated fee is made a prerequisite - in 
these cases the paper is not filed until the fee has been 
paid. Clearly that is the intent of the rule when it pro-
vides that the fee shall be paid when filing a document. 
This Court in an opinion written by then Chief Jus- , 
tice Wade sets forth the rule under 73(1) U.R.C.P. which 
in effect is the same as 73 (a) U.R.C.P. Bish 's Sheet Metal 
Company, a Utah Corporation vs. Chris J. Luras d/b;a 
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Liberty Bell Bakery Company, 11 Utah 2d 357, 359 P. 2d 
21, ( 1%1) at page 358 : 
''It is equally clear by the provisions of Rule 
73(1), U.R.C.P. that the filing of the notice of the 
a]Jpeal and the payment of the fees therefor \vith-
in the time allowed are the only requirements 
necessary for the court to have jurisdiction. All 
other steps, therefore, cannot affect the jurisdic-
tion but any failure to follow the dictates of the 
rules makes the appellant subject to appropriate 
action by the court which may even include dis-
missal of the appeal." 
As has been stated in the Bish's case, supra, the 
filing of the notice of the appeal and the payment of the 
fre within the time allowed are necessary jurisdiction 
requirements without which this court has no jurisdiction. 
Hence it follows that in this case the filing fee re-
quired by Rule 73(a) U.R.C.P. was not complied with by 
the appellant and the court should have dismissed the 
appeal. The appeal was not taken as required by the 
statute. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SH 0 WING JURISDICTIONAL 
GROUNDS FOR PROBATE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE ORDER ADMITTING THE WILL 
TO PROBATE. 
Counsel for Appellant suggests that the evidence 
received at the hearing held on January 4, 1966, is insuf-
fieient to show jurisdictional grounds for admitting the 
Will to probate. 
Clearly the record shows that all parties were given 
notice that the Petition to Admit the Will to Probate was 
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to be heard on January 4, 1966. Appellant was repre-
sented on that day by and through her counsel, Mr. Buell 
and Mr. Dillman. Appellants did not present one bit of ' 
evidence to show Mrs. Ratliff was not an actual and bona 
fide resident of Uintah County, State of Utah. Having 
failed to do so at that time and to refute the evidence of 
respondents, after notice should not now be subject to 
attack by the Appellants. 
Subsequent to the January 4, 1966, hearing in the , 
Utah 1Court, the Respondents filed a Motion to dislodge 
the Will held in Douglas County, Colorado on the basi:i 
that Mrs. Ratliff was a resident of Utah and further that 
the court of Utah had submitted the Will to probate and 
thereby became the court of original jurisdiction. 
A hearing was held on March 16, 1966, in Castle 
Rock, County of Douglas, State of Colorado before Hon-
orable Robert B. Lee, District Judge. The appellants sub- ' 
mitted no admissible evidence to show that the decedent 
was a resident of Colorado. 
The facts are that Mrs. Ratliff broke her hip in 
Vernal and was flown to Denver for medical treatment , 
and died a month and a half later. 
A residence once acquired remains until actually 
abandoned with the intent to reuonce the same, and to 
acquire a residence elsewhere, l\frs. Ratliff did not do 
either. 
The evidence and record clearly shows the legal resi- , 
dence of Mrs. Ratliff to be in Utah. Appellant introduced 
no evidence to the contrary at the time the Will ·was ad-
mitted to Probate in Utah or at the Colorado hearing. 
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From the evidence introduced on January 4, 1966, it 
is clear that the decendent was a resident of Vernal, 
Fintah ·County, State of Utah. She had voted in Vernal 
for many years, the latest being in the 1964 election. She 
had her home in Vernal, bank accounts, the witnesses to 
the Will of October 6, 1961 and the Codicil dated May 1, 
196:2, wPre Vernal residents and memorial services were 
held for the decedent in Vernal. None of these facts were 
contradicted to by appellant at any time. 
Tlw lower court did not err in admitting the "Will" 
to probate and its order should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
A WILL MAY BE ADMITTED TO PROBATE UPON 
THE PRODUCTION AND PROOF OF A CERTIFIED 
COPY OF A WILL WHERE THE WILL IS UN-
AVAILABLE. 
Counsel for Appellant state a certified copy of the 
original Will was improperly admitted to probate in Utah. 
\YhPre it was clearly explained to the court that the 
decedent was a resident of Utah and the fact that original 
jurisdiction should be in Utah the court did not err in 
admitting the "Will" to probate. The "~Will'' was not lost 
or destroyed but was actually in existence and lodged 
under the Colorado Statute in Douglas County. The Will 
has not been, and is not now, admitted to probate in Colo-
rado. The Colorado Court has not refused to transmit 
the Will to the Utah Court. The matter is still pending. 
At the Colorado hearing and prior to the attempted 
filing of this appeal the Colorado Court informed the 
appellant that unless she supplied it with cases sustain-
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ing her position, or, could show the Utah Court's Order 
Admitting Will to Probate was void, an order transmit. 
ting \Vill to the Utah Court would be issued. 
Respondents filed a Petition for Probate of ~Will in 
Utah, Fourth Judicial District, on November 19, 1965, 
and the same was set for hearing on November 30, 1965. 
At the request of Counsel for Appellant, the hearing wa~ 
continued. It was again noticed and heard on January±, 
1966, \\<'hen the Utah Court by appropriate order admitted ' 
the "Will'' to Probate . 
.Counsel for Appellant states (Brief P. 5) that tl1e 
Respondents could have challeneged the jurisdiction of 
the Court in Douglas County to admit the "Will" to pro-
bate on December 13, 1965. Respondents had no reason 
to as it was agreed that Colorado could handle the pro-
bate if the terms of the "Will" were carried out, hut 
Appellant's son and daughter filed the Caveat 'rhich 
contested the Will. 
In order to obtain the "\Vill" Respondent's counse1 
filed a Petition to dislodge the Will from the Colorado 
Court, immediately after the certified photo copy was 
admitted in Utah and argued the same on l\f arch 16, 19t16. 
Judge Robert B. Lee made an order staying proceeding1 
until the Utah Supreme Court rules on whether or not 
the Utah Courts order was void. Respondents will pro-
ceed to obtain the "\Vill" from Colorado if this court 
affirms the lower courts decision. 
It is true that the Utah Statute does not specifically 
provide that a certified photo-copy of a Will may be 
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admitted, however, the general equity power of a Probate 
Court, should recognize how much better evidence a cer-
tified photo-copy of the original Will is than an unsigned 
office co11y. CL>rtainly this is far superior evidence and 
,rithin the inknt of the legislature which was to permit 
the introduction of the best evidence of the Will available. 
Tht> "Will" was properly identified by Mr. Harold 
Sarg·ent ( t. p. J, 5, G,7) and he was one of the attesting 
11 itnesses t11ereto and it was duly identified in every re-
spect to ht' admitted to probate. The other attesting wit-
ne"s having died. ( T. p. 5). The evidence then showed 
that the decendent was a resident of Vernal, Uintah Coun-
t:-, State of Ftah, at the time of her deat hand that ap-
pellant introuuced no evidence to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
These facts when taken in light of the hearing held 
in Castle Rock, ·Colorado, on March 16, 1966, clearly indi. 
cate that the decendent was not a resident of Colorado or 
domiciled therein and the Court di dnot err in admitting 
the "Will" to probate. 
The court was correct m admitting the "Will'' to 
probate in Utah where the original "Will" was detained, 
but not admitted to probate, in a foreign court, so that 
respondents could not produce the same. The grounds 
for admitting the "Will'' to probate are set forth in 
75-3-3 U.C.A. (1953). The jurisdictional facts are set 
forth in the Petition of Respondents and the same were 
proved on January 4, 1966. 
The lower courts admitting the ·will to probate under 
these circumstances should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COLTON & HAMMOND 
Hugh ·w. Colton 
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